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Abstract:  This research report undertakes an interdisciplinary review of the concept of “control” (i.e. 
the idea that people should have greater “control” over their data), proposing an analysis of this con-
cept in the field of law and computer science. Despite the omnipresence of the notion of control in the 
EU policy documents, scholarly literature and in the press, the very meaning of this concept remains 
surprisingly vague and under-studied in the face of contemporary socio-technical environments and 
practices. Beyond the current fashionable rhetoric of empowerment of the data subject, this report at-
tempts to reorient the scholarly debates towards a more comprehensive and refined understanding of 
the concept of control by questioning its legal and technical implications on data subject’s agency. 
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The control over personal data : True remedy or fairy tale ? 
 
Résumé :  Ce rapport décrit les résultats d’une recherche interdisciplinaire sur la notion de contrôle 
sur les données personnelles. L’idée selon laquelle les individus devraient garder le contrôle sur 
leurs données personnelles est désormais prévalente dans de nombreux discours sur la protection 
de la vie privée aussi bien que dans des documents officiels d’UE. Pourtant ce concept de contrôle 
reste vague et assez peu analysé en tant que tel. Ce rapport tente de combler ce manque en 
questionnant la notion de contrôle d’un point de vue juridique et informatique en étudiant notamment 
ses implications sur la notion d’”agency” du sujet. 
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Introduction 
 
As personal data processing technologies change and create new possibilities to track and 
trace individuals, politicians and lawyers struggle to deal with their implications on 
informational privacy and data protection. Many claim that these problems can be tackled 
with improved statutory drafting techniques and call for legislation that would give 
individuals greater control over the processing of their data. More than ever the notion of 
control dominates the contemporary conceptual and normative landscape of data protection 
and privacy.  
 
Until now it has been often advocated as the key solution to face the problems raised by 
personal data processing technologies. Indeed, control is considered as a precious means of 
empowerment of the “digital self”: it is deemed to foster autonomy and ability to manage 
information about oneself and to have some limited dominion over the way he/she is viewed 
by society. For this reason, the notion of control is often mentioned, either explicitly or 
implicitly, as a core element of data protection policies. In the recent EU Proposal for a 
general data protection regulation, a set of legal instruments are potentially designed to put the 
data subject in control of his data such as the explicit consent requirement, the withdrawal of 
consent, the right to object, the right to be forgotten, the right to data portability, etc.  
 
Despite the omnipresence of the notion of control in the EU policy documents, scholarly 
literature and in the press, the very meaning of the notion of control as well as its normative 
implications remains surprisingly vague and under-studied in the field of data protection and 
privacy studies.  
 
From a fundamental rights perspective, control conceived as a set of “micro-rights” should 
undoubtedly be considered as a central element of any empowerment policy in the field of 
privacy and data protection. However, in the face of recent technological developments and 
emergence of new social practices which seem to undermine the very capacity or even the 
will of individuals to “self-manage” their informational privacy, this apparently simple and 
familiar notion becomes very ambiguous. What does it really mean to be in control of one’s 
data in the context of contemporary socio-technical environments and practices?
3
 What are 
the characteristics, the purposes and potential limits of such control? How to guarantee to 
individuals an effective control over their own data? Is legislation on data protection an 
appropriate instrument to ensure individual control?  
 
The ambiguities raised by the notion of control are best illustrated by the famous “privacy 
paradox” that has been largely commented in the literature. This paradox suggests that while 
internet users contend that they are concerned by their privacy and complain that they are not 
properly informed about what happens and how their data are exploited, yet they are often 
                                                          
3
 See online the Symposium dedicated to “The Privacy Paradox. Privacy and Its Conflicting Values”, Stan. L. 
Rev. Online, February 02, 2012 - April 12, 2012, http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-paradox. 
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willing to give away very detailed personal information either in exchange for a bargain or 
even for nothing on their social networks’ profiles.  
 
Interestingly, the tension constitutive of this paradox opposes two different ways of grasping 
the issue of control
4
. The first one is structural/objective and relates to the risks associated to 
what G. Deleuze used to call “control societies”5. In that respect, control refers to the notion 
of surveillance which can be exercised by public institutions or private companies in order to 
monitor, regulate and influence people’s behavior. The thematic of control as surveillance has 
been largely covered in the literature these last decades and has been recently reactivated after 
the NSA scandal and, more largely, the emergence of a new form of “algorithmic 
governmentality”6. The second way to apprehend the notion of control is individual/subjective 
and relates to the multiple ways individuals interact with each other and communicate 
personal information, and therefore participate in the self-construction of their digital 
identities. In that sense, control as agency refers to self-determination over information about 
oneself and self-management of privacy.  
 
This second way to grasp the notion of control will be the central focus of the report. If one 
has to acknowledge that disclosure of personal data is part of contemporary everyday life and 
practices of individuals, we contend that it is urgent to understand the meaning of the notion 
of control as well as to apprehend its pragmatic modalities. Hence, it is necessary to take the 
current rhetoric of control and empowerment seriously as it is advocated in EU policy 
documents and by the proponents of the “privacy as control” theory.  
 
This report undertakes an interdisciplinary review of the concept of “control”, proposing an 
analysis of this concept in the field of law and computer science. Part I explores the meanings 
of the concept of control as it is developed in data protection scholarship and EU law. Beyond 
the current fashionable rhetoric of empowerment of the data subject, this part aims at 
identifying and critically assessing the characteristics of the concept control and its normative 
consequences. Part II examines the concept of control from a technical point a view. It 
reviews and analyses the potentialities of various technical tools in making control more 
efficient. To conclude, Part III attempts to reorient data protection scholarship towards a more 
comprehensive and refined understanding of the concept of control. In particular, it takes up 
the claim that taking control seriously requires to focus more strenuously on two fundamental 
and intertwined issues: control of what and control by whom? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 Fuchs, O., (2011), Towards an alternative concept of privacy, JICES, Vol. 9, No. 4, p. 222. 
5
 See the concept of “les sociétés de contrôle” forged by Deleuze, G. (1990/2003), Pourparlers 1971-1990, Les 
Editions de Minuit, pp. 229-239 ; Haggerty, K. D. & Ericson, R. V. (2000), The surveillant assemblage. In: Brit-
ish Journal of Sociology, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 605-622. 
6
 Rouvroy, A. & Berns, Th. (2013), Gouvernementalité algorithmique et perspectives d’émancipation : le 
disparate comme condition d’individuation par la relation? In : Politique des algorithmes. Les métriques du web. 
Réseaux, Vol.31, No. 177, pp. 163-196. Available at: http://works.bepress.com/antoinette_rouvroy/47. See also 
Cheney-Lippold J. (2011), A New Algorithmic Identity. Soft Biopolitics and the Modulation of Control. In: 
Theory, Culture & Society, Vol. 28, No. 6, pp. 164-181.  
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I. The concept of control in data protection and privacy scholarship 
 
The concept of control is of paramount importance in the literature dedicated to privacy and 
data protection. This concept is not new and long before the internet era control over personal 
information has been considered as one of the dominant definitions of “privacy”. The 
“privacy as control” theory has been constructed in reaction against the definition of privacy 
as a “right to be let alone” advocated by the famous attorneys Brandeis and Warren at the end 
of the nineteen century
7
. Conceived in this fashion, privacy is a condition of insulation 
deemed to guarantee freedom from interference or intrusion upon personal sphere. For many 
scholars, this conceptualization of privacy abusively conflates privacy with liberty and 
misleadingly suggests the existence of a private sphere, a “bubble” that surrounds the self and 
into which other individuals and organizations cannot encroach
8
. Instead, the proponents of 
the control theory argue that privacy has nothing to do with protecting one’s space from 
intrusion, but is determined by the ability to control personal information
9
. 
 
In that regard, the most influential formulation of privacy is perhaps the one proposed by A. 
Westin (1967) who describes privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to 
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is 
communicated to others”10. The idea that privacy is the ability of the individual to control the 
terms under which personal information is acquired and used has been endorsed by a broad 
community of scholars. C. Fried (1968) also recognizes that being able to maintain control 
over personal information is crucial. It allows us to create the necessary context for 
relationships of respect, trust, friendship and trust. For this author, “privacy is not simply an 
absence of information about us in the minds of others; rather it is the control we have over 
information about ourselves”11. Along the same lines, J. Rachels (1975) argues that there is a 
close connection between the ability to control who has access to one’s information and one’s 
ability to maintain a variety of social relationships with different types of people
12
. W. Parent 
(1983) also tried to provide a more detail account of the control theory that does not overlap 
with other familiar values such as liberty, autonomy, solitude, secrecy, etc. He defines privacy 
in narrow terms as the condition of not having undocumented personal information known by 
others; therefore recognizing the importance of choice and control about “facts that most 
persons in a given society choose not to reveal about themselves or facts about which a 
                                                          
7
 Brandeis L., & Warren S. (1890), The Right to Privacy. In: Harvard L. Rev., Vol. 4, pp. 193-220.  
8
 Bennett, C. J. (2011), In Defense of Privacy : The Concept and the Regime. In: Surveillance & Society, Vol. 8, 
No. 4, p. 488. 
9
 H. T. Tavani (2000), Privacy and the Internet. In: B.C Intell. Prop. & Tech., p. 2, 
http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/st_org/iptf/commentary/content/2000041901.html. As H. Tavani points out 
the conception of privacy has evolve from one concerned with intrusion and interference to one that has been 
concerned with information: “[…] it must be noted that recent theories of privacy have tended to center on issues 
related to personal information and to the access and flow of that information, rather than on psychological 
concerns related to intrusion into one’s personal space and interference with one’s personal affairs.” 
10
 Westin, A. F. (1967). Privacy and freedom, Atheneum Press, New York.  
11
 Fried, Ch. (1968), Privacy. In: Yale L. J., Vol. 77, p. 482. 
12
 Rachels, J. (1975), Why privacy is important. In: Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 4, p. 326. 
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particular person is extremely sensitive and which he therefore does not choose to reveal 
about himself”13.  
 
Nowadays, the “privacy as control” theory is more vivid than ever and has been also endorsed 
by more recent commentators dealing with contemporary issues raised by complex digital 
environments, practices and devices. Therefore, current literature focuses more on 
informational privacy and data protection issues than on privacy stricto sensu
14
 and the 
concept of control is more than ever advocated as the key solution to face the problems raised 
by current personal data processing technologies
15
. Control is not only mentioned as a core 
element of conceptual reflections, but also as a prescriptive remedy proposed by scholars
16
.  
 
Current “privacy as control” theories emphasize the role of choice and individual self-
determination over other values. In that regard, they can be described as information 
management theories where control is achieved through the subjective management and 
expression of personal preferences
17
. Accordingly, individuals are deemed to be able to 
determinate was it good for themselves and consequently decide to withhold or disclose more 
or less personal information to the others
18
. Control is then conceptualized as an individual, 
dynamic and flexible process whereby people can make themselves accessible to others or 
close themselves. As M. Birnhack puts it, privacy as control is “[…] the view that a right to 
privacy is the control an autonomous human being should have over his or her personal 
information, regarding its collection, processing and further uses, including onward 
transfers.”19 In this view, control takes the shape of the right of individuals to know what 
information about themselves is collected, to determine what information is made available to 
third parties, and to access and potentially correct their personal data. 
 
Beside self-determination and self-management, informational privacy scholars have also 
conceptualized control and data subject’s rights in terms of property. Indeed, an important 
part of the privacy literature has focused on property-based metaphors and descriptions to 
sustain the argument that a greater control over personal information could be achieved 
through market-oriented mechanisms based on individual ownership of personal data. 
According to this view privacy can be compared to a property right: “[P]rivacy can be cast as 
                                                          
13
 Parent, W. A. (1983), Recent Work on the Concept of Privacy. In: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 20, 
No. 4, p. 341. For Parent, personal information is “undocumented” in the sense that this information does not 
belong to the public record. 
14
 For the difference between privacy and data protection, see Hustinx P. (2005), Data Protection in the Europe-
an Union. In: Privacy & Informatie, pp. 62-65. 
15
 Peppet, S. R. (2011), Unraveling Privacy : The Personal Prospectus and the Threat of a Full-Disclosure Future. 
In: Northwestern U. Law Rev., Vol. 105, p. 1183: “But even a cursory review of the literature should suffice to 
demonstrate that control dominates as the primary solution of privacy advocates”. 
16
 Schwartz, P. M. (2000), Internet Privacy and the State. In: Conn. L. Rev., Vol. 32, p. 820 (“The leading 
paradigm…conceives of privacy as a personal right to control the use of one’s data”); Cohen, J. E. (2000), 
Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object. In: Stan. L. Rev., Vol. 52, p. 1379 (“Data 
privacy advocates seek … to guarantee individuals control over their personal data.”); Calo M. R. (2011), The 
Boundaries of Privacy Harm. In: Ind. L.J., Vol. 86, p. 1134 (describing privacy harms as “the loss of control over 
information about oneself or one’s attributes”); Litman, J. (2000), Information Privacy/Information Property. In: 
Stan. L. Rev., Vol. 52, p. 1286 (“[A]ctual control [of information] seems unattainable.”). 
17
 Solove, D. J. (2013), Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Paradox. In: Harvard L. Rev., Vol. 126, pp. 
1880-1903. 
18
 Fuchs, Ch. (2011), op. cit., p. 223. 
19
 Birnhack, M. D. (2011), A Quest for A Theory of Privacy : Context and Control. In: Jurimetrics, Vol. 51, No. 
4, p. The author draws this definition from Allan Westin’s 1967 seminal article.  
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a property right. People should own information about themselves and, as owners of property, 
should be entitled to control what it is done with it”20. Or as V. Bergelson puts it “[i]n order to 
protect privacy, individuals must secure control over their personal information by becoming 
real owners.”21 
 
In this view, the control over one’s personal data is directly connected to the idea of legal or 
beneficial ownership of them
22
. In that sense, the concept of control evokes this kind of 
absolute power or sovereignty over things conventionally associated with the property regime. 
Such a basic conception of property entails an “exclusivity axiom” which theoretically allows 
the owner to protect one’s good from unwanted uses and grant him fully alienable rights23. In 
this conception, free alienability is considered as a quintessential aspect of any logics of 
propertization of personal data and controlling one’s data would then legally mean being 
entitled to trade and exchange them on the “privacy market”.  
 
Despite being anchored in completely different legal backgrounds, both of these conceptions 
(control as self-determination and as property) share common theoretical assumptions about 
privacy that originated in liberal worldviews. Indeed, the concept of control is strongly 
associated with the conventional figure of the “rational and autonomous agent”, capable of 
deliberating about personal goals, controlling the course of the events and acting under the 
direction of such deliberation. The sense of control that the liberal picture relies on is, first, 
individualist, in the sense that it emphasizes individual choice, self-governance, and, overall, 
self-direction of one’s life24. In that regard, the concept of control seems to confer to the data 
subject an extraordinary kind of sovereignty. For it permits each individual to define, 
unilaterally and independently, his relationships with others. Moreover, in this view, privacy 
is conceived as the separation of the self from others and society at large. Second, it is active, 
in the sense that it stresses agency and construction of a life for oneself
25
. In this view, control 
over personal data control cannot be reduced to the mere exercise of one’s right to be let 
alone. Instead it refers to individual’s ability or willingness to make decisions to control the 
use and sharing of information through active choice. Therefore, this active choice implies, on 
one hand, an effective participation of the data subjects in the management of their data
26
, on 
                                                          
20
 Litman, J., (2000), op. cit., p. 1286. 
21
 Bergelson, V. (2003), It’s Personal but Is It Mine?, Toward Property Rights in Personal Information. In: U.C. 
Davis L. Rev., Vol. 37, p. 383. 
22
 Baron, J. B. (2012), Property as Control : The Case of Information. In: Michigan Telecom. & Tech. L. Rev., 
Vol. 18, 2012, p. 409 (“My argument has been that medical and other information is in at least one important 
way alike: it is information over which individuals seek control. It is control, I have argued, that has led to calls 
for the propertization of information.”) 
23
 Rose, C. M. (1998), Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety. In: Yale L. J., Vol. 108, p. 603.  
24
 Let’s note that to this individualistic conception of the human agent corresponds an instrumental conception of 
technical artifacts. These are reduced to mere tools at the disposal and at the service of the autonomous and 
intentional subject. Action is conceived as the rational execution of plan and presupposes the participation of 
artefacts reduced to functional entities. In this model, there is a radical separation between a subjectivity which 
intrinsic to the human agent and an objectivity hold by the extern reality (instrument). See Thévenot, L. (2002), 
Which road to follow ? The moral complexity of an ‘equipped’ humanity. In: Law, J. & Mol, (eds.), 
Complexities : Social Studies of Knowledge Practices, Durham and London, Duke University Press, pp. 53-87. 
25
 Frey, R. G. (2000), Privacy, Control and Talk of Rights. In: Social Philosophy and Policy, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 
45-67. 
26
 A general assumption of the control theory is that data subjects can be expected to behave as if they are 
performing a calculus (cost-benefit analysis) in assessing the outcomes they will receive as a result of 
information disclosure.  
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the other hand, a liberty to alienate their data as long as this choice and the subsequent 
alienation is informed and voluntary.  
 
At this stage of our analysis, it should be noted that both individualistic and active dimensions 
of control have been subject to criticisms, which sometimes are formulated by the proponents 
of the control theory themselves. Space does not permit an exhaustive overview of the 
objections formulated against the concept of control. However, it is important to note that 
some scholars have developed more nuanced conceptual accounts. On one hand, recent 
attempts in the literature aim at overcoming strictly individualistic accounts of privacy by 
paying attention to the collective aspects of privacy which is conceived as a common good or 
a social value
27
. On the other hand, some scholars have tackled the complex issues raised by 
alienability and control ceases to be conceived as an absolute and exclusive power, but as a 
prerogative which in some instances can or need to be restricted
28
. 
 
Despite these various attempts to refine the control theory in the field of privacy and data pro-
tection law and ethics, some commentators consider that the concept of control still remains 
too vague and ambiguous
29
. Although we do not disagree that control is a crucial issue, we 
share this argument.  
 
We believe that, when defined purely in managerial terms, the concept of control or the 
control theories can hardly be disentangled from other privacy theories. Indeed, the concept of 
privacy encompasses a myriad of definitions which all require to a certain extent some level 
of control from the user. In the literature, the systematic inclusion of elements of control in 
definitions of privacy is particularly obvious in the various attempts of classification proposed 
by different authors. For instance, in the taxonomy developed by D. Solove, different types of 
privacy are enumerated. Alongside “control over personal information”, 5 other types of 
definitions are mentioned: (1) the right to be left alone; (2) limited access to the self; (3) 
secrecy; (4) personhood; and (5) intimacy
30
. It is truly not clear what specifically 
distinguishes control over personal information from other types of actions or interests 
regarding privacy. To be sure, to be able to limit access, to ensure one’s right to be let alone, 
to secure confidentiality individuals must be able to exercise some degree of control over their 
personal information. If narrowly conceived in managerial terms, the concept of control 
seems to be an essential characteristic of any definition of privacy and loses a great deal of its 
potential significance. Even among restricted access theories, which are conventionally 
opposed in the literature to control theories
31
, references to the notion of control seem 
unescapable. In these theories, one element of control concerns avoiding unwanted intrusion 
                                                          
27
 J. E. Cohen (2001), “Privacy, Ideology, and Technology : A Response to Jeffrey Rosen”, Geo. L. J., Vol. 89, 
p. 2039: “[w]e have tried to move the concept of privacy well beyond control and individual consent, re-
conceptualizing it in various ways as a social good that deserves protection for reasons beyond individual wel-
fare.” 
28
 Schwartz, P. M. (2004), Property, Privacy and Personal Data. In: Harvard L. Rev., Vol. 117, No. 7, pp. 2055-
2128. 
29
 Shoemaker, D.W. (2010), Self-exposure and exposure of the self-informational privacy and the presentation of 
identity. In: Ethics Inf. Technol., Vol. 12, p. 4. As Shoemaker points it out, defining control simply as a matter of 
information management does not say anything about the extent of the control required or about what specifical-
ly counts as a relevant zone of personal information that should be kept under control. See also Tavani, H. T. 
(1999b), KDD, data mining, and the challenge for normative privacy. In: Ethics and Information Technology, 
Vol. 1, pp. 265-273. 
30
 Solove, D. (2008), Understanding Privacy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge M.A. 
31
 Tavani, H. T. (2008), Informational privacy: concepts, theories and controversies. In: Himma, K. E. & Tavani, 
H. T. (eds.), The Handbook of Information and Computer Ethics, Wiley, Hoboken, Nj, pp. 142 ff.  
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or interference by others into one’s private space and, consequently, implies the limitation of 
other’s access to the self32 and the control of personal boundaries33 and environment34.  
 
Overall we think that the ambiguity surrounding the concept of control is mainly due to a 
misleading conflation between conceptualization and management of privacy. In order to 
reach a refine understanding of the notion of control and its link to privacy theories and 
polices, it is important to draw a distinction between the different uses and roles of this 
notion
35
. Accordingly, it is important to differentiate the conceptual dimension of control – i. 
e. control as conceptual foundation of privacy - from its instrumental dimension – i. e. control 
as a tool for the management of privacy. In the next section we will focus on the instrumental 
dimension of control as it has been deployed by EU institutions.  
 
 
II. The notion of control in the EU policy documents 
 
Over the last decades, the idea that individuals should have an effective control over their own 
data has become a key notion of the rhetoric deployed by EU institutions in the field of data 
protection. In many policy documents, control is advocated as an important tool for protecting 
privacy and achieving the empowerment of data subjects. In this section, we will explore 
some of these documents and try to identify the main characteristics of the notion of control 
as it is featured in EU documents.  
 
Before starting the analysis of these characteristics, it is worth formulating a few preliminary 
remarks. First, the notion of control is mentioned in documents of very diverse nature, ranging 
from preparatory works for legislation and legislative text, to experts opinions, to vulgarized 
material addressed to citizens, etc. This diversity illustrates the pervasiveness of the rhetoric 
of control in the field of data protection. Second, as we will see hereafter, in most of these 
documents, the notion of control takes the shape of a toolbox at disposal of the data subjects: 
they get equipped with a set of subjective “micro-rights” which supposedly enable them to be 
in control at the different stages of the processing of their data. Third, the notion of control 
appears to have a much more extended meaning than in the scholarly literature given the 
operational/instrumental dimension of the EU policy documents
36
.  
  
Here is a limited list of EU documents mentioning the notion of control in the recent years:  
- 2013 Proposal for a general data protection regulation37; 
                                                          
32
 R. Gavison (1980), Privacy and the Limits of Law. In: Yale Law Journal, Vol. 89, pp. 421-472. 
33
 Altman, I. (1976), Privacy: A Conceptual Analysis. In: Environment and Behavior, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 7-29. 
For Altman, privacy is conceived as a “boundary control process”, the selective control over access to oneself.  
34
 C. Goodwin (1991), Privacy: Recognition of a Consumer Right. In: Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 
Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 149-166. For Goodwin, privacy includes two dimensions of control: control over presence of 
others in the consumer’s environment and control over information dissemination.  
35
 Along the same lines, see H. T. Tavani & J. H. Moor (2001), Privacy Protection, Control of Information, and 
Privacy-Enhancing technologies. In: Computers & Society, pp. 6-11. For the authors, any relevant theory of pri-
vacy should distinguish between three components: concept, justification and management.  
36
 Th. C. Grey (1989), Holmes and Legal Pragmatism. In: Stan. L. Rev., Vol. 41, pp. 805-806. 
37
 See Draft of the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection 
Regulation), Unofficial consolidated version after LIBE Committee vote provide by the Rapporteur, October 
22th, 2013. 
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- 2012 Communication from the Commission, Safeguarding Privacy in a Connected 
World. A European Data Protection Framework for the 21th Century
38
; 
- 2012 European Commission brochure and movie “Take control of your personal 
data”39; 
- 2011 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of 
consent
40
; 
- 2010 Communication from the Commission, A comprehensive approach on personal 
data protection in the European Union
41
; 
- 2009 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “The Future of Privacy42.  
 
For the sake of clarity, we will especially focus on two documents which, despite their 
distinctive nature, are highly representative of the current rhetoric of control fostered by EU 
institutions.  
 
The first document is a communication adopted by the European Commission in 2012, titled 
“Safeguarding Privacy in a Connected World. A European Data Protection Framework for the 
21st Century”. This communication is part of the works pertaining to the reform of the EU’s 
data protection framework. In the very beginning of this document, it is explicitly stated that 
“[i]n this new digital environment, individuals have the right to enjoy effective control over 
their personal information.”43 Following that logic, the first half of the communication is 
entirely dedicated to the thematic of control as it is featured in section 2 “Putting individuals 
in control of their personal data”.  
 
Firstly, the document mentions different issues raised by digital environments which under-
mine the effectiveness of data protection rules: the lack of harmonization of the member states 
legislations and the data protection national authorities, the ever-increasing volume of col-
lected data, the perception of loss of control by citizens, etc. Relying on this overview of the 
situation, the communication then recalls one of the main ambitions of the new legislative act 
proposed by the Commission: “The aim […] is to strengthen rights, to give people efficient 
and operational means to make sure they are fully informed about what happens to their per-
                                                          
38
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committees of the Regions, Safeguarding Privacy in a Connected World. A European Data 
Protection Framework for the 21th Century, COM(2012) 9 final, Brussels, 25.01.2012. 
39
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sonal data and to enable them to exercise their rights more effectively.”44 In order to achieve 
this aim, the Commission proposes a set of new rules which will: “improve individuals’ abil-
ity to control their data”; “improve the means for individuals to exercise their rights”, “rein-
force data security”, and “enhance the accountability of those processing data”.  
 
More precisely, four objectives are mentioned which are supposed to empower the data sub-
jects to “improve individuals’ ability to control their data”45. Foremost among these objec-
tives, is the principle of consent and the reinforcement of the related legal requirements. This 
comes as no surprise since consent remains a cornerstone of the EU approach to data protec-
tion. Indeed, from a fundamental rights perspective, it is conventionally considered as the 
“best way for individuals to control data processing activities”46. Although consent plays a 
key role in giving control to data subjects
47
, it is not the only way to do this. The Commission 
also aims at equipping individuals with a right to be forgotten, guaranteeing data accessibility 
and a right to data portability, and reinforcing the right to information.  
 
In addition to this “bundle” of rights granted to the data subject, the communication equally 
points to other rules which are deemed to foster a more effective management of personal 
information. Very interestingly, the Commission seeks to reinforce control by additional rules 
which are of a radically different nature than the micro-rights granted to the data subject. 
They consist of an heterogeneous set of organizational and technological tools such as: (i) 
improved administrative and judicial remedies, by strengthening national data protection 
authorities’ independence and powers and enhancing administrative and judicial remedies 
when rights are violated; (ii) reinforced security measures, by encouraging the use of privacy-
enhancing technologies, privacy-friendly default settings and privacy certification schemes; 
(iii) increased responsibility and accountability, in particular by requiring data controllers to 
designate a data protection officer; introducing the “privacy by design” principle and 
introducing the obligation to carry out data protection impact assessments for organizations 
involved in risky processing. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, it is also worth paying attention to a second document issued 
by the European Commission in 2012. This document explicitly titled “Take control of your 
personal data” is a small brochure published to raise awareness among EU citizens about the 
new legal reform and, more precisely, about the changes that will strengthen citizens’ rights in 
the field of data protection
48
. With the help of simplistic slogans, garish fluorescent fonts and 
fancy drawings, the Commission tries to convey its message to the general public: “Every 
time you go online you share information about yourself. And the more you do online the 
more important it is that you and your personal data are protected. The EU is proposing 
                                                          
44
 See, p. 5. 
45
 See, p. 6. 
46
 See Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (Rapporteur J. Ph. Albrecht), Report on the 
proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection 
Regulation) (COM(2012)0011 – C7-0025/2012 – 2012/0011(COD)), November 21th, 2013, p. 200. See also 
Opinion 15/2011 of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, op. cit., p. 8. 
47
 See D. J. Solove, « Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Paradox », loc. cit., pp. 1880-1903; Ch. Lazaro 
& D. Le Métayer (forthcoming in Autumn 2014), Le consentement au traitement des données à caractère per-
sonnel : une perspective comparative sur l’autonomie du sujet. In : Rev. Juridique Themis, Vol. 48, No. 3.  
48
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changes that will strengthen your protection online. The new EU laws are designed to put you 
in control of your own information and safeguard your right to personal data protection.”49 
 
Despite its naïve comic strip-like format, it is interesting to observe that the approach to con-
trol deployed in this document is structured along the same lines than the aforementioned 
communication. Indeed, alongside micro rights granted to data subjects
50
, the brochure makes 
also reference to other organizational or technological instruments which are supposed to fos-
ter control such as: contact points (where to go and who to talk to in case of problems); pri-
vacy by default (make to settings of all websites privacy-friendly; possibility to change the 
privacy settings yourself); notification breach to the concerned person and the Data protection 
authority in case the data have been lost or stolen; and more globally the harmonization (same 
protection everywhere in the EU; high level of protection regardless of where your personal 
data are stored and handled). 
 
The overview of these two radically different documents published by the EU institutions in 
the recent years reveals a much more entangled approach to control than it is conceived in 
scholarly literature. In these documents, the framing of the privacy issue and the 
implementation of data protection through control has a dual nature, both 
individual/subjective and organizational/structural. 
 
On one side, the granting of a set of micro-rights to the data subject echoes the main tenets of 
the control theories: the empowerment of the subject through individual choice and 
participative agency
51. In that sense, the concept of control refers to individual’s ability to 
make decision about one’s personal data trough autonomous choice. According to the right-
based approach embedded in EU policy documents and legislation, the rational and 
autonomous data subject gets then equipped with tools which will improve the way he or she 
can control the conditions under which one’s personal information is collected, used, and 
transferred. Eventually, this “legal equipment” aims at transforming the data subject in an 
active agent who can (and ought to) shape one’s own digital live52.  
 
On the other side, although the individual remains the main agent of control and of the 
decision-making process in the rhetoric developed by the EU institutions, the notion of 
control gets somewhat extended beyond strictly individualistic approaches. In particular, the 
regulator mobilizes a more operational notion of control that cannot be reduced to the purely 
subjective and mental activity of an autonomous data subject. For the regulator, it is also clear 
that individual control cannot be exercised without putting a “control architecture” in place53, 
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 The same “slogan” is repeated at the very end of the brochure: “The new EU laws will put you in control of 
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50
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51
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namely a set of structural measures that aim at creating a reliable and secure environment for 
the data subject. Framed in such a way, control over personal data is not treated solely as a 
matter of individual negotiation and party autonomy in contracting arrangements, but as an 
operation that is also potentially dependent on other important “environmental” variables: 
technological (i.e. security measures, privacy by default settings, etc.) and organizational (i.e. 
accountability of data controllers, privacy impact assessment, etc.).  
 
On closer examination, the analysis of the EU documents shows the diversity of normative 
tools that the data subject has to be equipped with in order to get control over one’s own data 
and, more globally, to keep up with technological change
54
. 
 
 
 
III. Control from the technical point of view 
 
The previous sections have shown that the notion of control is multifaceted, but most of the 
interpretations of control, if not all, assume that the subject must be able to act, in one way or 
another, to exercise his rights. In the digital world, these actions are mostly carried out 
through information technologies. A relevant question at this stage is therefore: what does 
control mean in the technical world and can technologies provide appropriate tools to support 
the notions of control proposed by lawyers and philosophers? 
 
First, it is worth noting that the view of control as a set of “micro-rights” in the fundamental 
rights perspective is very much in line with the view of control in computer science
55
. One of 
the most common uses of the term “control” in this area can be found in the expression “ac- 
cess control” in computer security. Access control can be seen as a technique for restricting 
access to a resource (for example a personal data) to authorised users. Interestingly, a differ-
ence is made in computer security between discretionary access control, in which the owner 
of an object defines the rules, and mandatory access control, in which the rules are defined by 
the system administrator. This difference raises the question of who is the actor in charge of 
deciding, or who is “in control”.    
 
Another interesting observation about the notion of control in computer security is that its use 
has been extended to “usage control”, precisely to provide ways to implement legal provisions 
in the area of intellectual property. In contrast with access control, usage control makes it pos-
sible to control the object also during its usage, for example to enforce time limitations or a 
maximum number of uses. Usage rights can also be conditioned to certain obligations. Usage 
control can typically be useful to implement Digital Right Management, but it has also been 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
enhancing their own well-being. See N. Rose (1992), Governing the enterprising self, In: P. Heelas & P. Morris 
(eds.), The values of the enterprise culture. The Moral Debate, Routledge, London – New York, pp. 141-163. In 
the field of data protection, the overall picture seems to us far more complex.  
54
 Such a diversity of tools is also characteristic of the “mixed approach” developed in the new Proposal for a 
general data protection regulation. Although the data subject’s control is one of the strategic objectives targeted 
by the Proposal, there is no explicit reference to the concept of control among the legal provisions. However, it is 
mentioned in recital 6 which very basically states that “individuals should have control of their own personal 
data”, while insisting on the need to build strong and more coherent data protection framework in the Union in 
order to foster the digital economy and to reinforce certainty for all the actors (emphasis added). See also recital 
(51a). 
55
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suggested to apply it to personal data management, for example to limit the use to the de-
clared purpose. 
 
In the context of operating systems, control also includes other “micro-rights” such as the 
rights to create, read, modify or delete a file, or to get access to a directory list and these rights 
can be granted to individuals or to groups of users.  
 
To sum up, the different variants of control in computer science can be classified according to 
two main criteria:  
- What is the subject of the control (who is supposed to be in control)? 
- What is the object of the control (what does the subject control)? 
 
As far as privacy enhancing technologies are concerned, one must admit that they mostly re-
flect the individualistic view discussed in Section 2. However, as we will show hereafter, the 
collective dimension of control is also supported by some recent tools. With respect to the ob-
ject of the control, three main categories of tools can be identified: the first one, sometimes 
called TETs (for Transparency Enhancing Technologies), basically supports the right to be 
informed, the right for the subject to know what happens to his personal data; the second one, 
supports all “active rights” of the subject such as the right to express his consent, or to have 
his data modified or deleted; the third one supports “negative rights”, such as the right to pre-
vent the disclosure of his data (or to ensure the implementation of the “data minimization” 
principle).  
 
In the remainder of this Section, we first study the object of control (and the aforementioned 
three types of rights) in Subsection 3.1 before discussing the subject of control (and the indi-
vidual versus collective views) in Subsection 3.2 and concluding with some reflexions on the 
relativity of control in Subsection 3.3. 
 
 
A. The object of control: a set of micro-rights   
 
The exercise of control rights of the subject requires a deliberate action on his part, which 
means not only that the system should make this action possible but also that it should provide 
sufficient information to the subject to ensure that he can properly understand the situation 
and take well-informed decisions. The first type of technology that provides valuable support 
to the subject in this phase is sometimes called the “transparency enhancing technologies” 
(TET)
56
. 
 
 
TETs (for Transparency Enhancing Technologies): the right to be informed 
 
TETs can take different forms depending on the context and the type of information provided 
to the user. As far as web sites are concerned, the simplest forms of TET are the “privacy 
icons” which are visual signs designed to make it possible to get at a glance the main features 
of the privacy policy of the site (data collected, purpose, deletion delay, etc.). Users can then 
parameterize their privacy policy in such a way that their browser can automatically check 
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 Mireille Hildebrandt, Bert-Jaap Koops. "The Challenges of Ambient Law and Legal Protection in the Profiling 
Era" The Modern Law Review 73.3 (2010): 428-460. 
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that the policy declared by a site meets their own policy and to inform them (for example 
through specific icons) of the result of the verification
57
. 
 
Some websites also provide a dashboard functionality informing users about the personal data 
stored
58
 and what third parties can get access to it. But this kind of site must have very care- 
fully designed interfaces to ensure that they do not mislead users
59
. For example, the 
European PrimeLife project has proposed a Firefox extension called Privacy Dashboard, that 
allows users to know some of the practices of the websites they are using, for example 
whether they use cookies, geolocation, third party content or other tracking means. An icon 
displays a more or less happy face depending on the overall evaluation of the web site
60
. 
 
Specific solutions have also been proposed to improve the privacy interfaces of social net- 
works, for example to reduce unnoticed over-sharing of information, to make it easier to find 
out to whom a particular attribute is visible
61
 or to help users avoiding to make posts that they 
may later regret
62
. 
 
Personal data are sometimes collected without the subject being aware of it and by parties that 
he has never heard about. This happens typically through cookies created on his computer 
while he is browsing and used by a variety of companies to track his activities and ultimately 
to serve him personalized advertisements based on his browsing profile. Users can get a 
picture of the tracking going on behind their back using a tool like Lightbeam
63
 (formerly 
Collusion) which is a Firefox add-on recording the events associated with the visited sites and 
allowing users to display a graph showing the tracking sites and their interactions. Several 
tools such as TaintDroid
64
 or Mobilitics
65
 have also been proposed for smartphones which 
represent another major source of leak of personal data. 
 
 
Active rights: consent, modification, deletion, etc. 
 
When he has reached a decision about his privacy preferences, the next step for the data 
subject is to express this decision. Several techniques are available to help him in this task. 
They differ mostly in terms of scope (general purpose versus specific) and interfaces. On the 
                                                          
57
 Privacy Bird is an example of browser add-on (for Internet Explorer) that provides this facility 
58
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general purpose side, a number of languages have been proposed to express privacy policies
66.
 
The general principle is that both the subject and the controller (typically a web site) should 
be able to author privacy policies which are translated into a machine readable format. The 
policies can then be processed automatically and matched to ensure that a controller collects 
only personal data associated with a privacy policy (defined by the subject) consistent with 
his own policy. As an illustration, tools like P3P
67
 and Privacy Bird
68 
allow respectively web- 
sites to declare their privacy policies and visiting users to have these policies analyzed and 
compared with their own preferences. Depending on the result of the matching, different icons 
can be displayed in order to inform the user and let him either accept to visit the site, refuse, 
or look further into his privacy policy (in which case, Privacy Bird can also be used to display 
the policy in a user-friendly way, starting with a summary). The preferences of the user can be 
set through a number of panels allowing him to choose different levels of protection for 
different types of data (health, financial, etc.). 
 
However, this approach raises several challenges. For this kind of consent to be legitimate 
from a legal point of view, it must be free, specific, informed and unambiguous
69
. For 
example, the categories of data that can be used in P3P or Privacy Bird may be too coarse in 
many situations and force the users to disclose more data or grant to third parties broader 
rights than they would really like to. Most languages may also lead to ambiguities or 
statements that can be interpreted in different ways. Ambiguities may come from the use of 
vague terms but also from the combination of rules or the default rules
70
. One of the criticisms 
raised against early privacy frameworks such as P3P was their lack of clarity and the 
divergent (or even misleading) representations of privacy policies
71
. An option to solve the 
ambiguity problem is to re- sort to a sound, mathematical definition of the semantics of the 
language. This approach has been followed in several proposals, such as CI
72
 and S4P
73
 and 
SIMPL
74
. Even though their scope goes beyond the definition of privacy policies
75
 and they 
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may have a strong impact in the future, these academic results have not moved out into the 
field yet. One reason why these languages have not been deployed yet is the fact that their 
generality raises new challenges in terms of user interface: to be really usable, they should be 
integrated within tools allowing users to express their choices in a convenient and efficient 
way. 
 
Another option provided by most browsers is the Do Not Track
76
 feature that allows users to 
express a choice not to be tracked in their browsing activities. This opt-out choice is 
communicated to visited websites through a specific DNT HTTP header sent every time data 
is re- quested from the Web. However, there is no consensus yet on how web sites should 
precisely interpret this DNT signal.  As a result, many sites simply ignore them while others 
may limit the amount information that they collect.    
 
More generally, the actual enforcement of the privacy choices of the data subject depends 
very much on the localization of the personal data. In fact, the only decisions of the data 
subject that can be enforced locally are his choices concerning cookies, popups or ad 
blockers. These choices are implemented on the device of the subject as browser (or Flash 
Player) options or extensions. As long as they know how to do it, subjects can also decide at 
any time to erase cookies stored on their computer
77
 or their browsing history. The 
enforcement of all other types of consent rely on the existence of appropriate technical means 
on the side of the controller (and, in some cases, of other stakeholders) and their proper 
execution. The subject has therefore no choice but to put some trust on the data collector: he 
must trust him for having such technical means in place (and not trying to bypass them). As 
discussed in the next subsection, this trust could be enhanced through compliance audits 
conducted by independent third parties. 
 
As suggested above, one technical option to ensure the implementation of privacy policies is 
to resort to DRM like technologies to monitor the use of personal data
78
. Personal data would 
then be managed in the same way as digital content (e.g. video or music) but it is not clear 
whether this solution is really viable considering that personal data would easily be copied 
after it is output from the DRM system to be used for the purpose. Experience has also shown 
that DRM techniques can often be bypassed with moderate effort. As stated by Manuel Hilty, 
David Basin and Alexander Pretschner, “at the very least, DRM can act as a support 
mechanism … and thereby increase the likelihood that the obligations are fulfilled, or at least 
pre- vent unintended violations resulting from carelessness.”79 Another extreme solution 
would be to require data controllers to use a trusted computing environment to process 
personal data. Such a trusted platform ensures that the system behaves as expected at the price 
of having a unique encryption key loaded in the hardware and made inaccessible to the user. 
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This solution has been used in specific cases such as healthcare information processing
80
 but 
it remains to be seen whether it can become a more widely adopted solution considering the 
controversies about the trusted computing technology itself, which results in a loss of control 
of the users on their own computers
81
 (and an increased control of the computer 
manufacturers and software providers). 
 
 
Negative rights: non-disclosure, data minimization 
 
Many other technologies (sometimes called “privacy enhancing technologies” or PETs) are 
available to enforce privacy rights
82
. The main goal of PETs is to reduce as much as possible 
(or even to prevent) the disclosure of personal data (typically through the use of cryptographic 
techniques). For example, it is possible to use PETs to implement a smart metering system in 
which the operator does not get any personal data of the users (apart from their quarterly fee). 
This is made possible through a combination of architectural choices (the fee is computed 
locally, on the equipment of the users) and appropriate cryptographic protocols (to ensure that 
the users are accountable: they cannot cheat on the computation of the fee). 
 
This notion of “privacy by architecture” differs from the usual vision of “privacy by control” 
since the user does not have to take any action: the design of the system ensures that his or her 
personal data will not be disclosed. If to use the Latourian terminology, one can say in that 
case that control is entirely delegated to non-human actors. 
 
This analysis is also in line with the distinction made by some authors between hard privacy 
and soft privacy
83
, which are associated with different trust assumptions: hard privacy (as 
illustrated by PETs) tries to avoid as much as possible placing any trust in any third party (or 
to reduce this trust), while soft privacy is based on the assumption that the subject will, 
technically speaking, lose control over his data and therefore will have no choice but to place 
a certain amount of trust in the data controller. In the latter situation, technologies for 
enforcing the rights of the subject can then be seen as ways to reduce this “loss of control” 
and to organize it in the best interest of the subject (information, consent delivery, 
accountability, etc.). 
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B. The subject of control: individual versus collective views 
 
The above discussion about “privacy by architecture” versus “privacy by control” also echoes 
the debate on the “individualistic” versus “collective” views of control and privacy: “privacy 
by architecture” can be seen as a form of collective control because the decision to implement 
privacy protections is imposed by some authority which is supposed to represent the interests 
of the subjects as a whole. Ideally, the design of the system could even be approved or 
certified by an independent third party. 
 
This collective view of privacy, even if not dominant in the technological landscape, is sup- 
ported by other types of tools. For example, regardless of the actual level of information that 
they can obtain, one could argue that individuals are always in a weak position when they 
have to take decisions about the disclosure of their personal data because they generally do 
not have the necessary expertise to fully understand all legal and technical aspects of the 
situation. One solution to redress this imbalance is to provide some form of collaboration be- 
tween individuals to help them analyze privacy policies and warn their pairs about 
inacceptable terms. ToS;DR
84
 (Terms of Service; Didn’t Read) is an example of effort in this 
direction. The goal of ToS;DR is to create a database of analyses of the fairness of privacy 
policies and to make this information available in the form of explicit icons (general 
evaluation plus good and bad points) which can be expanded if needed into more detailed 
explanations. Users can also install a browser add-on to get the ratings directly when they 
visit a page. A key aspect of ToS;DR is the fact that users can submit their own analysis for 
consideration, the goal being that, just like Wikipedia, a group consensus will emerge to 
provide a reliable assessment of each policy. This type of tool is especially interesting as they 
promote a broader notion of control, less individualistic and more collective (even if the final 
decision always pertains to the subject). 
 
Accountability (at least in its strongest forms, when it requires auditability by independent 
third parties) can also be seen as a form of collective approach in the sense that it ensures that 
the subject is not left alone in front of the data controller.  The key idea behind the notion of 
accountability is that data controllers should not merely comply with data protection rules but 
should also be able to demonstrate compliance or “showing how responsibility is exercised 
and making this verifiable”, as stated by the Article 29 Working Group85. Technologies can 
facilitate accountability through the privacy policy languages and frameworks mentioned 
above. They can also contribute to accountability of practices to ensure that data controllers 
can be in a position to demonstrate that their practices, hence their use of personal data, com- 
plies with their obligations. The main piece of evidence for accountability of practices should 
be execution logs recording all events that can have a potential impact on this compliance. 
Technologies are available to support log secure storage
86
 and their use to conduct audits
87
.  
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C. Control as a relative notion 
 
Paradoxically, the term “control” as interpreted by lawyers seems to be used as a key privacy 
principle in situations where “control”, in the technical sense, is effectively relinquished, or at 
least shared, by the subject. Indeed, in most situations, subjects actually lose the control over 
their personal data as soon as they disclose them in the sense that they cannot have 100% 
guarantees concerning the use of their data by the data controller. This should not imply that 
control is a meaningless or illusory principle though, but this observation argues in favour of 
an interpretation of control as a relative notion. The main lesson to be drawn from this 
analysis is therefore that technical means are available to enhance control but lawyers and 
policy makers should avoid overreliance on this notion of control because it cannot be, from a 
practical point of view, an absolute protection. 
 
 
 
 
IV Conclusion 
 
More than ever the notion of control plays a pivotal and pervasive role in the discourse of 
privacy and data protection. Privacy scholarship and regulators propose to increase individual 
control over personal information as an ultimate prescriptive solution: it is considered as a 
crucial means of management of digital identity and empowerment of the data subject. 
Nevertheless, at a time of ever-increasing digitalization of life and global circulation of data, 
such rhetoric seems at odds, if not totally paradoxical. Indeed the premise of autonomy and 
active agency implied in this rhetoric seems to be radically undermined in the context of 
contemporary digital environments and practices. Exploring this ambiguity from an 
interdisciplinary perspective, this report passes in review the different meanings of the notion 
of control and tries to clarify the characteristics of this notion as it is developed in several 
sources of the literature and EU policy documents.  
 
As we have seen, the policy or regulatory initiatives in the field of data protection described in 
this report represent a more entangled approach to control than the strict individualistic 
paradigm of the “privacy as control” theory developed in the scholarly literature. In the EU 
policy documents, control is conceived as a dual notion, both individual and structural. In the 
eyes of the regulator, the burden of controlling personal information cannot only weigh on the 
data subject ’shoulders. For control and the related micro-rights granted to the data subject to 
be effective, it has to be supported by structural measures.    
 
The (ab)use of the fashionable rhetoric of control by policymakers tends then to obscure this 
structural dimension, but even a cursory review of the EU policy documents reveals that the 
idea of control is not dissociated from the implementation of organizational and technical 
measures. This shows that the regulator is aware that control over personal information cannot 
only be a matter of individual agency. To be sure, control cannot be properly achieved if the 
data subject is not put in a position to monitor that the data controller actually complied with 
his privacy preferences. Similarly, control becomes almost impossible when the data subject 
has to deal with privacy-unfriendly default settings and technologies. Therefore the regulator 
seeks to reinforce individual control by additional rules which consist of a heterogeneous set 
of organizational and technological tools that foster, for instance accountability and privacy 
by design mechanisms.   
 
The control over personal data: True remedy or fairy tale ?   
 
 
 
22 
 
Despite their appeal to a much more extended and operational meaning of the notion of 
control, we would like to argue that EU policymakers fall short of grasping the crucial issues 
raised by the notion of control. This is mainly due to the fact that they still remain excessively 
attached to the individualistic paradigm according to which the data subject is depicted on the 
basis of the conventional figure of the “rational and autonomous agent”, this monadic and 
abstract individual capable of deliberating about personal goals and of acting under the 
direction of such deliberation88. The reliance on this overtly simplistic account of human 
agency impedes to further investigate the pragmatic modalities of the operation of control 
and, more specifically, to apprehend the normative consequences of two fundamental 
questions: control of what and control by whom and? Taking control seriously requires then 
raising the issues of the object and the subject of control. 
 
The first question raised by the thematic of control relates to the definition of its object. What 
is the target of individual control and can it be limited to personal information as it is defined 
in data protection legislation? What does it really mean to be in control of one’s data in the 
context of contemporary socio-technical environments and practices? Nowadays individual 
control can certainly not be considered as a panacea to solve the thorny issues raised by “Big 
Data phenomenon” and the ever-evolving data mining and profiling practices. In particular, 
individuals are often not aware or do not understand how this happens, who collects their da- 
ta, nor how to exercise control because the use and further transfer of personal data is very 
often done in an extremely complex and non-transparent way. This situation of course 
strongly undermines the very idea of control. 
 
Besides the voracious collection and use of personal information, the big data phenomenon 
also raises the issue of control over large amounts of data which cannot be included in the 
category of “personal data” as it is currently defined by the legislation. Indeed, the 
construction of profiles by private and public organizations is based as much (if not more) on 
these “impersonal” data as on personal data voluntary (or not) provided by the individuals. 
For some scholars, one of the main drawbacks of the current EU legal framework is its 
excessive and misleading focus on the so-called personal data. As A. Rouvroy contends, this 
“fetishisation”89 of personal data contributes to obscure the real impact of data mining and 
profiling activities: the capacity of data subjects to exercise control over their “profiles”90 and 
the development of an effective right of data management, especially with regard to data 
qualified as behavioral and inferred from digital practices. Moreover, the conventional 
opposition be- tween personal and anonymous data tends to fall apart as “reidentification” 
techniques get more sophisticated, allowing computer scientists to “deanonymize” individuals 
hidden in anonymized data with disconcerting ease
91. For C. Priens, “[t]his then will require a 
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debate on the role of the public domain in providing the necessary instruments that will allow 
us to know and to control how our behavior, interests and social and cultural identities are 
‘created’.”92  
 
The second fundamental question raised by the thematic of control relates to the 
determination of its subject/agent and implies to interrogate the skills and competences of 
contemporary data subjects. Who are these data subjects and are they really able to cope with 
the ever- growing complexity of digital environments? Who can be said to be “in control”?    
 
As it has been unveiled these last years by research in the field of behavioral economics, 
cognitive sciences or human-computer interaction, the complexity is such that our judgments 
in this area are prone to errors, stemming from lack of information or computational ability; 
or from problems of self-control and biased decision-making process. For instance, people 
time and attention are limited. It is impossible to control every single piece of information 
about oneself which circulates on the networks through myriads of channels and databases. 
Moreover, while sharing their data with the members of social networks or with various 
providers, people might suffer from an “illusion of control”93. Another consequence of the 
emphasis on active choosing/control is the difficulty raised by the situations where people 
prefer not to choose. Indeed, the costs imposed on data subjects can be so high in complex 
and technical areas they are unfamiliar with that majority of them tend to “stick” to default 
options instead of exercising their freedom of choice and being in control of the situation
94
. 
How can one conciliate the idea of control with the cognitive and behavioral biases that 
hamper users’ privacy and security decision making?    
 
On a more analytical level, let’s note that even in the hypothetical case where the data 
subjects would be perfectly aware and competent, the logics of control assumes perhaps too 
rap- idly that voluntary disclosure of personal information causes no privacy problems
95
. 
However, we believe that it is nearly impossible for that data subjects to really measure the 
breadth of their disclosure and the long term effects of their actions. It is then very unlikely 
that they can suffer no harm even from a potentially informed, autonomous and responsible 
decision
96
. 
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For these different reasons, the issue of the agent of control should be addressed with much 
more caution and attention than it is currently the case. Although proponents of the control 
theory and policymakers rightly recognize the importance of control, they put so much 
emphasis on its subjective dimension that they fail to adequately capture the limits of the 
normative and technical tools put at the disposal of data subjects. If actual empowerment and 
meaningful autonomy of data subjects are to be achieved, granting them “micro-rights”97 and 
providing them with privacy management technologies is certainly not enough. Indeed, the 
complexity of digital environments and practices is such that one should not expect data 
subjects to become privacy experts
98
 and bear all the risks and responsibilities of privacy 
management alone. For control to become more than an empty notion, one should therefore 
definitely embrace the idea that people act and transact in society not simply as individuals in 
an undifferentiated social world, but as individuals in certain capacities, in distinctive socio- 
technical contexts. This necessarily implies to integrate in our understanding of the data 
subject’s agency the inescapable collective dimension of control. To put it simply, control 
over information cannot become effective as long as is not conceived and implemented in 
terms of shared engagement and cooperation between different human and non-humans 
actors
99
. 
 
On one hand, the various modes of cooperation with non-human actors and the delegation of 
action to machines has to be tackled more carefully. In digital environments, the exercise of 
control is highly mediated by technical devices which can enhance but also hinder an agent’s 
capacity to make choices and determine the course of his or her action. In that regard, privacy 
management technologies deemed to provide more transparency and to allow more granular 
control over privacy settings do not necessarily solve the users’ problems because they can 
increase their cognitive costs, without addressing the underlying cognitive and behavioral 
biases
100
. As we have seen in section 3, the diversity of technical tools at the disposal of data 
subjects as well as their intrinsic working often adds another layer of complexity. 
 
On the other hand, treating control over personal data solely as a matter of individual 
negotiation and party autonomy in contracting arrangements neglects the underlying relations 
of powers between actors as well as the collective impact of privacy management which goes 
beyond individual welfare. In that regard, making control meaningful implies envisioning and 
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creating new modes of relations and cooperation between human actors (data subjects, public 
institutions, and private organizations) which would enable a much more balanced 
distribution of risks and responsibilities. In the Proposal for a general data protection 
regulation, the EU legislator already took a few steps into this direction, by imposing new 
obligations on data controllers
101
 and by taking into consideration the situations where there is 
a significant imbalance between parties
102
. Alternatives to classical regulation such as 
“nudge”103 or “crowdsourcing”104 could also presumably offer new ways to make control 
more effective. 
 
In offering a brief overview of the two fundamental question raised by the thematic of control, 
our goal is to foster discussion and encourage a more nuanced understanding of the concept of 
control. For the empowerment of the data subject to be effective, we believe that there is an 
urgent need to develop an account of agency of data subjects which takes into consideration 
the multi-dimensional and varied intersections between individual capabilities and socio- 
technical environments, including the engagement of the individuals in meaningful 
participation and collective activity. In the absence of such reconceptualization, the idea of 
control over personal information pervading current legal and political debates about privacy 
will amount to nothing more than a fairy tale. 
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